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From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the
Incarceration Revolution
Bernard E. Harcourt*
The incarcerationrevolution of the late twentieth century fueled ongoing
research on the relationship between rates of incarceration and crime,
unemployment, education, and other social indicators. In this research, the
variable intended to capture the level of confinement in society was conceptualized and measured as the rate of incarcerationin state andfederal prisons and
county jails. This, however, fails to take account of other equally important
forms of confinement, especially commitment to mental hospitals and asylums.
When the data on mental hospitalization rates are combined with the data
on imprisonment rates for the period 1928 through 2000, the incarceration
revolution of the late twentieth century barely reaches the level of aggregated
institutionalization that the United States experienced at mid-century. The
highest rate of aggregated institutionalizationduring the entire period occurred
in 1955 when almost 640 persons per 100,000 adults over age 15 were institutionalized in asylums, mental hospitals, and state andfederalprisons.
Equally surprising, the trend for aggregated institutionalizationreflects a
mirror image of the national homicide rate during the period 1928 through
2000. Using a Prais-Winstenregressionmodel that correctsfor autocorrelation
in time-series data, and holding constant three leading structural covariates of
homicide, this Article finds a large, statisticallysignificant, and robust relationship between aggregatedinstitutionalizationand homicide rates.
These findings underscore, more than anything, how much
institutionalization there was at mid-century. The implications are both
practical and theoretical. As a practical matter, empirical research that uses
confinement as a value of interest should use an aggregatedinstitutionalization
rate that incorporatesmental hospitalization rates. At a theoreticallevel, these
findings suggest that it may be the continuity of confinement-and not just the
incarcerationexplosion-thatneeds to be explored and explained.
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Tom Miles, John Monahan, and Richard Posner for comments on the paper; to Stephen Schacht at
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Introduction

The classic texts of social theory from the 1960s tell a consistent story
not only about the rise and (in some cases) fall of discrete carceral
institutions, but also of the remarkable continuity of confinement and social
exclusion. This pattern is reflected in the writings of Erving Goffman on
Asylums,1 Gerald Grob on The State and the Mentally 11,2 David Rothman on
The Discovery of the Asylum, 3 and Michel Foucault. 4 In Madness and
Civilization, for instance, Foucault traces the continuity of confinement
through different stages of Western European history, from the lazar houses
for lepers on the outskirts of Medieval cities, to the Ships of Fools navigating
down rivers of Renaissance Europe, to the establishment in the seventeenth
century of the H6pital G6ndral in Paris-that enormous house of confinement for the poor, the unemployed, the homeless, the vagabond, the criminal,
and the insane. 5
Surprisingly, this literature never made its way into the empirical social
science research on the incarceration revolution of the late twentieth century.
With the marked exception of a few longitudinal studies on the
interdependence of mental hospital and prison populations,6 as well as a
small subset of the empirical research on the causes of the late-twentieth
century prison explosion,7 no published empirical research conceptualizes the
level of confinement in society through the lens of institutionalization writ
large. Uniformly, the research limits the prism to rates of imprisonment
only. None of the research that uses confinement as an independent

1. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS

AND OTHER INMATES (1961).
2. GERALD N. GROB, THE STATE AND THE MENTALLY ILL: A HISTORY OF WORCESTER STATE
HOSPITAL INMASSACHUSETTS 1830-1920 (1966).
3. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN

THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971).
4. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (Richard Howard trans., Vintage Books

1988) (1961).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Peter N. Grabosky, Rates of Imprisonment and Psychiatric Hospitalization in the
United States, 7 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 63 (1980) (examining the interrelation between prison and

mental hospitalization rates 1930-1970); Allen E. Liska et al., Modeling the Relationship Between
the CriminalJustice and Mental Health Systems, 104 AM. J. SOC. 1744 (1999) (examining the
reciprocal relationship between the mental health system and the criminal justice system); Henry J.
Steadman et al., The Impact of State Mental HospitalDeinstitutionalizationon United States Prison
Populations, 1968-1978, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1984)

(employing both a

comparative framework and a longitudinal framework to analyze the relationship between mental
hospital and prison populations).
7. See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, Explaining the Growth in U.S. Prison Populations: 1977-1998 (July
17, 2004) (unpublished working paper, on file with author); Steven Raphael, The
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill and Growth in the U.S. Prison Populations: 1971 to 1996
(Sept.
2000)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://istsocrates.berkeley.edu/-raphael/raphael2000.pdf (finding that mental hospitalization rates have
significant negative effects on prison incarceration rates).
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variable-in other words, that studies the effect of confinement (and possibly
other social indicators) on crime, unemployment, education, or other dependent variables-includes mental hospitalization in its measure of
confinement. 8 Moreover, none of the binary studies of confinement-in
other words, research that explores the specific relationship between confinement and unemployment, or confinement and crime, or confinement and
any other non-mental-health-related indicator-uses a measure of coercive
social control that includes rates of mental hospitalization. 9 Even the most
rigorous recent analyses of the prison-crime relationship use only imprisonment data.10 Though a tremendous amount of empirical work has been done
on long-term crime trends," structural covariates of homicide,12
unemployment, 3 and the prison expansion, 14 none of this literature

8. See, e.g., Robert H. DeFina & Thomas M. Arvanites, The Weak Effect of Imprisonment on
Crime: 1971-1998, 83 Soc. Sci. Q. 635, 644 tbl.1 (2002) (investigating the effect of prison
incarceration rates on crime by using per capita imprisonment rates); Steven D. Levitt,
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: FourFactors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do
Not, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2004, at 163, 177-79 (examining the rising prison population as a
factor in the reduction of crime during the 1990s).
9. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Soumyo Moitra, An Analysis of Time Series of the
Imprisonment Rate in the States of the United States: A FurtherTest of the Stability of Punishment
Hypothesis, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 376, 377-89 (1979) (examining trends in
imprisonment rates by state, noting "(tihe data also exclude prisoners in ... mental institutions, and
other forms of incarceration"); Lee H. Bowker, Crime and the Use of Prisons in the United States:
A Time Series Analysis, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 206, 208 tbl. 1 (1981) (deriving imprisonment rates by
using the number of prisoners in state and federal institutions and examining the relationship
between crime and incarceration rates); Theodore G. Chiricos & Gordon P. Waldo, Punishmentand
Crime: An Examination of Some EmpiricalEvidence, 18 SOC. PROBS. 200, 203-06 (1970) (using
state prison data in an examination of the relationship between certainty and severity of punishment
and crime rates); Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison PopulationSize on Crime Rates: Evidence
from Prison OvercrowdingLitigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319, 323 (1996) (using prison overcrowding
litigation as a variable to analyze the effects of prison population on crime); William J. McGuire &
Richard G. Sheehan, Relationships Between Crime Rates and Incarceration Rates: Further
Analysis, 20 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 73, 77 tbl.l (1985) (deriving imprisonment rates by using the
number of "individuals confined in state and federal institutions" and examining the relationship

between crime and incarceration rates).
10. E.g., DeFina & Arvanites, supra note 8 (analyzing the effect of imprisonment on seven
criminal offenses using annual state-level data); Levitt, supra note 9; Levitt, supra note 8; Thomas
B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Jr., Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction, 10 J.

QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 109, 127 (1994) (investigating the relationship between state prison
population and crime rates).
11. See, e.g., Blumstein & Moitra, supra note 9, at 377 (examining state prison populations
"from 1926 to 1974"); Lawrence E. Cohen & Kenneth C. Land, Age Structure and Crime:
Symmetry Versus Asymmetry and the Projection of Crime Rates Through the 1990s, 52 AM. Soc.

REv. 170, 170 (1987) (analyzing "annual rates of homicide and motor vehicle theft from 1946 to
1984").
12. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Land et al., Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Any
Invariances Across Time and Social Space?, 95 AM. J. Soc. 922, 922 (1990) (explaining that the

current empirical literature on the structural covariates of homicide rates contains inconsistent
findings across time periods and geographical units, and that a reestimation of the regression model
greatly reduces these inconsistencies).
13. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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conceptualizes confinement through the larger prism of institutionalization,
and none of it aggregates mental hospitalization data with prison rates.
This is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, the empirical data on
mental hospitalization reflect extraordinarily high rates of institutionalization
at mid-century. Simply put, when the data on mental hospitalization rates are
combined with the data on prison rates for the years 1928 through 2000, the
incarceration revolution of the late twentieth century barely reaches the level
of aggregated institutionalization that the United States experienced at midcentury. 15 The highest rate of aggregated institutionalization during the entire twentieth century occurred in 1955 when almost 640 persons per 100,000
adults over age fifteen were institutionalized in asylums, mental hospitals,
and state and federal prisons. Throughout almost the entire period from 1938
to 1960, the U.S. population experienced rates of institutionalization in
excess of 600 inmates per 100,000 adults. Figure 1 shows the aggregate rate
of institutionalization in the United States for the period 1928 to 2000, as
well as the disaggregated trend lines for mental hospitalization on the one
hand and state and federal prisons on the other.

14. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Joel Waltman, The Recent Rise and Fall of American
Violence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 1, 1-12 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Waltman eds., 2000)
(noting the enormous expansion of the prison population); Levitt, supra note 8, at 178-79
(examining the link between increased punishment and lower crime rates); Marvell & Moody, supra
note 10, at 109 (suggesting that regression analysis is a better tool for estimating the impact of
increased imprisonment on crime rates); William Spehnan, The Limited Importance of Prison
Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 97, 125 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds.,
2000) (concluding that increased incarceration was an important contributing factor to the reduction
of violent crime in recent years).
15. For a description of the methodology employed to determine the institutionalized
population rates discussed in this Article, see infra subpart Ill(A).
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Figure 1: Institutionalization in the United States (per 100,000 adults)
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Aggregating mental hospitalization and imprisonment rates into a
combined institutionalization rate significantly changes the trend line for
confinement over the twentieth century. We are used to thinking of confinement through the lens of incarceration only, and to referring to the period
prior to the mid-1970s as one of "relative stability" followed by an exponential rise-and I include myself here. 16 As a literal matter, this is of course
right. If all we are describing is the specific variable in our study and the
source of the data, then indeed the observations are relatively stable over the
five decades. But the truth is, what we are trying to capture when we use the
variable of imprisonment is something about confinement in an institutional
setting-confinement that renders the population in question incapacitated or
unable to work, pursue educational opportunities, and so forth. And from
this larger perspective, the period before 1970-in fact, the entire twentieth
century-reflects remarkable instability.
Second, for anyone who has spent time looking at longitudinal data on
homicide in the United States, the aggregated institutionalization trend from
Figure 1 is shocking: it reflects a mirror image of national homicide rates.
This is visually represented in the following figure, Figure
2, using vital
17
statistics data from the National Center for Health Statistics.

16. See

BERNARD

E.

HARCOURT,

AGAINST

PREDICTION:

PROFILING,

POLICING,

AND

PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 230, on file with the author
and the Texas Law Review) (noting that the shift from rehabilitation in the 1950s to incapacitation
in the 1980s and 1990s can be traced to the popular rise of actuarial methods in predicting and
controlling criminality); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF

BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 4 (2001) (describing the dramatic increase in incarceration from the
1970s to the 1990s).
17. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., National Vital Statistics
System, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss.htin.
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Figure 2: Institutionalization and homicide rates (per 100,000 adults)
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The relationship between aggregated institutionalization and homicide
rates in Figure 2 is remarkable, at least at first glance. Later in this Article, I
test and quantify the relationship and find that, correcting for autocorrelation
in the time-series data and holding constant the leading structural covariates
of homicide (poverty, demographic change, and unemployment), the relationship is large, statistically significant, and robust.1 8 Naturally, the
correlation does not begin to explain the relationship. These are aggregated
national level time-series data and, as such, they provide weak power to rule
out alternative explanations for the patterns observed in the data. But what
this does suggest is that we may need to revisit all of our empirical studies
that use the imprisonment rate as a proxy for confinement.
In this Article, I explore the continuity of spatial exclusion and
confinement in the United States from the high rates of mental
hospitalization in the mid-i1950s to the high rates of imprisonment at the turn
of the twenty-first century, and argue that when we conceptualize
confinement for purposes of longitudinal research on crime, unemployment,
education, or any other social indicator, we should use an aggregated
institutionalizationrate that includes both mental hospitalization and prison
rates. The potential implications are wide ranging and particularly salient for
sociological, criminological, and economic research into the incarcerationcrime relationship and punishment theory more generally.
My purpose in this Article is not to prove an institutionalizationhomicide relationship, nor to question the studies on the incarcerationunemployment relationship. Instead, my goal is more limited: to reconnect
social theory to empirical research; to take seriously the writings on the
asylum from the 1960s and 1970s and to allow those writings to inform our

18. See infra subpart 111(B).
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empirical research; and to provoke us all-myself included-to rethink confinement through the lens of institutionalization.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II locates the central idea of
the Article in the larger social theory literature and reviews some of the empirical research surrounding the incarceration expansion. Part III presents the
empirical data on aggregated institutionalization rates and offers preliminary
quantitative findings on the institutionalization-homicide relationship. Part
IV then offers reflections on possible interpretations and directions for future
research.
II.

Asylums and Penitentiaries

A. The Social Theory
Leading social theorists of the 1960s identified a continuity of spatial
exclusion and confinement between the asylum and the penitentiary. Erving
Goffman's essays are a good place to start.' 9 Goffman located the asylum
within the space of what he called "total institutions"-a class of institutions
that includes prisons, jails, sanitaria and leprosaria, almshouses for the poor
and infirm, army barracks, boarding schools, and monasteries.20 These total
institutions, Goffman explained, are marked by a "basic split" between a
group of inmates removed from
the outside world and a staff that is inte21
grated with that outside world:
A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work
where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the
wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an
enclosed, formally administered round of life. Prisons serve as a clear
example, providing we appreciate that what is prison-like about
prisons is found in institutions whose members have broken no laws.
This volume deals with total institutions
in general and one example,
22
mental hospitals, in particular.
It is the continuity-and discontinuities-between the different "total
institutions" that Goffman explored in his work, tracing the contours of the
asylum inmate's world and the inmate's relation to the supervisory
staff, and
23
in the process producing a manual on the structure of the self.
David Rothman similarly explored total institutions but from the perspective of social history.24 He too located the asylum squarely in a shared
space with the prison, the sanitarium, the orphanage, and the almshouse. The

19. GOFFMAN, supra note 1.
20. Id. at 4-5.
21. Id. at 7.

22. Id. at xiii.
23. Id. at 1-124.
24. ROTHMAN, supra note 3.
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question Rothman posed was: "Why in the decades after 1820 did
[Americans] all at once erect penitentiaries for the criminal, asylums for the
insane, almshouses for the poor, orphan asylums for homeless children, and
reformatories for delinquents? 2 5 It is this "revolution in the practices toward
the insane" that Rothman sought to explore and explain-a revolution that
encompasses institutionalization writ large.26
Institutions, Rothman
observed, became places of "first resort, the preferred solution to the
problems of poverty, crime, delinquency, and insanity. 27 In remarkably
Durkheimian fashion, Rothman's answer turned on social and moral
cohesion--on the perceived need to restore some form of social balance
during a time of instability at the birth of the new republic.2 8 In this quest for
stability and social cohesion, the invention of the penitentiary, the asylum,
and the almshouse-as well as houses of refuge, reformatories, and orphan
asylums-represented an ordering of spatial exclusion necessary to appease
apprehension of the unknown.
It produced, again, a continuity of
confinement.
In Madness and Civilization, Foucault also documented the continuity
from the lazar homes for lepers on the outskirts of villages in the Middle
Ages to the all encompassing houses of confinement
in the seventeenth
29
century, to the birth of the asylum in the modem age:
Leprosy disappeared, the leper vanished, or almost, from memory;
these structures remained. Often, in these same places, the formulas
of exclusion would be repeated, strangely similar two or three
centuries later. Poor vagabonds, criminals, and "deranged minds"
would take the part played by the leper .... With an altogether new
meaning and in a very different culture, the forms would remainessentially that major form of a rigorous
division which is social
30
exclusion but spiritual reintegration.
Goffman's "total institutions" were all reunited in the establishment in
1656 by Louis XIV of the H6pital Grn6ral in Paris.3 1 Once an arsenal, a rest
home for war veterans, and several hospitals, the new 1lpital Grnrral served
as a house of confinement for the poor, the homeless, the unemployed,
prisoners, and the insane-those who sought assistance and those who were

25. Id. at xiii.
26. Id. at 128.
27. Id. at 131.
28. See id. at 133 (observing that the goal of the asylum system was to create a "new world of
the insane [that] would correct within its restricted domain the faults of the community and through
the power of example spark a general reform movement" and noting that that "broad program had
an obvious similarity to the goals of the penitentiary").
29. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 1-4.

30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 37.
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sent there by royal or judicial decree. 32 In the space of several months, one
out of every hundred inhabitants of Paris would find themselves confined in
these institutions. 33 What characterized the house of confinement was precisely its indiscriminate nature: "the same walls could contain those
condemned by common law, young men who disturbed their families' peace
or who squandered their goods, people without profession, and the insane. 34
An outpouring of critical work in the 1960s and 70s, from the Left and
from the Right, portrayed the mental hospital as an inherently repressive
institution, on par with the prison. Drawing on the writings of Thomas
Szasz, especially, The Myth of Mental Illness,35 as well as on the works of
Goffman, Rothman, Foucault, and Michael Ignatieff, 36 these critical writings
contributed to the idea of continuity in confinement.3 7 From this perspective,
mental illness was "an abstraction designed to rationalize the confinement of
individuals who manifested disruptive and aberrant behavior" and the
asylum's primary function was to "confine social deviants and/or
unproductive persons. 38
B. The Empirical Social Science Research
But little of the social theorizing made its way into the measurement of
coercive social control for purposes of empirical research, data collection,
and statistical analyses. The one exception, naturally, involves studies of the
interdependence of mental hospitalization and prison populations. This research specifically explores whether the deinstitutionalization of mental
hospitals in the 1960s fed prison populations, contributing to the rise in incarceration in the following decades. 39 But other than this specific body of
literature, the link between the asylum and the penitentiary has essentially
been ignored.

32. See id. at 43 ("We must not forget that a few years after its foundation, the H6pital G~ndral
of Paris alone contained six thousand persons, or around one percent of the population.").
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. THOMAS SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF
PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961) (arguing against modem psychiatry and denying the existence of
mental illness).
36. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL

REvOLUTION, 1750--1850, at 210 (1978) ("The persistent support for the penitentiary is inexplicable
so long as we assume that its appeal rested on its functional capacity to control crime. Instead, its
support rested on a larger social need. It had appeal because the reformers succeeded in presenting
it as a response, not merely to crime, but to the whole social crisis of a period ... ").
37. See GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1875-1940, at ix
(1983) (stating that 1960s "revisionist scholars" thought "mental illness was not an objective
description of a disease within the conventional meaning of the term; it was rather an abstraction
designed to rationalize the confinement of individuals who manifested disruptive and aberrant
behavior").

38. Id. at ix-x.
39. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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This is the product, in part, of the balkanization of research on systems
of social control.4
Criminologists and sociologists of punishment have
turned most of their attention recently-and justifiably-to the massive
prison build-up. 4' Historians of mental health systems, in contrast, have had
their own remarkable trend to explain: the massive deinstitutionalization of
mental health patients.42 The focus of their research predominantly has been
to analyze the shift to deinstitutionalization, and much of the research has
explored alternative explanations to the traditional humanitarian gloss. 4 3 But
the two research interests seem not to have intersected.
It is also, in part, an accident of history. Much of the longitudinal
research into structural covariates of homicide and the incarceration-crime
relationship was conducted using pre-1980 data during a period of perceived
stability of imprisonment-for instance, the important work of Alfred
Blumstein on the stability-of-punishment hypothesis, 44 research on the
prison-crime nexus,45 leading studies on covariates of homicide,46 and
research of the National Research Council's Panel on Deterrent and

40. See Liska et al., supra note 6, at 1744 ("The last decade has witnessed a plethora of social
control studies, ranging from imprisonment to psychiatric hospitalization. Unfortunately, research
on each of these two forms tends to be isolated from the other, and research on the relationships
between them is limited.").
41. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., William Gronfein, Incentives and Intentions in Mental Health Policy: A
Comparison of the Medicaid and Community Mental Health Programs, 26 J.HEALTH & Soc.
BEHAV. 192, 192 (1985) ("State hospital populations have declined substantially since the mid1950s, falling by more than 75% from 1955 to 1980.").
43. Gronfein shows that the structure of reimbursement policies that came into effect with the
passage of the federal Medicaid program was the decisive factor in moving toward

deinstitutionalization-and not, as many tend to think, the mere policy choice, nor the funding of
community mental health centers. Id. at 193. But see Uri Aviram et al., The Effects of Policiesand
Programs on Reduction of Mental Hospitalization, 10 SOC. SCI. & MED. 571, 576 (1976) ("In an
attempt to account for variations in the decline trends for inpatients in mental institutions between
and within states during a 15-yr period, we found an association between the pattern of decline and
change in administrative policies and programs.");
Stephen Rose, Deciphering
Deinstitutionalization:Complexities in Policy and Program Analysis, 57 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 429, 434-35 (1979) (discussing various factors scholars have proposed as influencing
deinstitutionalization, such as a humane new concept of mental health, fiscal motives, and the role
of psychotropic drugs).
44. See Blumstein & Moitra, supra note 9, at 389 ("In examining the trends in the per capita
imprisonment rates in the forty-seven states, it has been noted that almost half, twenty, are trendless,
i.e., stationary, and that the trends in the remainder are small, i.e., less than 2% of the mean per year
in all cases. These findings are thus consistent with the general homeostatic process previously
observed in the United States as a whole and in other countries.").
45. See, e.g., Bowker, supra note 9, at 206 (extending a previous analysis that reported a
positive relationship between crime and imprisonment); Chiricos & Waldo, supra note 9, at 200
(extending prior research by examining three points in time instead of one and by examining
changes in prior rates of crime); McGuire & Sheehan, supra note 9, at 73-74 (extending prior
research by accounting for "lag structures and interdependencies characterizing the relationships").
46. See, e.g., Land et al., supra note 12, at 922 (demonstrating "that the empirical literature on
the structural covariates of homicide rates contains inconsistent findings across different time
periods and different geographical units").
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Incapacitative Effects.47 The shock of the incarceration explosion in the
1980s and 1990s led most researchers-including Blumstein 48-to revise
their earlier findings on the stability of punishment, and triggered an outpouring of new research on the effect of incarceration on crime, this time
using 1990s data. 49 But the temporal disjuncture obscured the role of mental
hospitalization: By 1999, the number of persons in mental hospitals was5 0so
relatively small that the rate of mental hospitalization seemed insignificant.
Lack of attention to the link between the asylum and the penitentiary
also reflects the wide gulf between critical social theory and quantitative
research. Whatever the explanation, though, the result is striking: no
published empirical research conceptualizes confinement through the lens of
aggregated institutionalization. The criminology has failed to connect the
prison to the asylum.
For instance, Alfred Blumstein, in his account of crime trends in the
introduction to The Crime Drop in America-generally perceived as an
authoritative compilation on recent crime trends-never addresses aggregated institutionalization. 5' With regard to the sharp increase in crime in the
1960s, Blumstein hits on all the usual suspects-the baby-boom generation,
political legitimacy, economiCS52-and includes later the usual explanations
for the 1990s crime drop--changing drug use patterns, decreased gun
violence, New York-style policing, the federal COPS program, and increased
incarceration.5 3 Notably absent in all of this, though, is the relationship between mental health and prison populations. It is simply nowhere in the
analysis. Here, then, are the major causes of the trends from the 1960s to
1990s, according to Blumstein:
The marked growth in violence between 1965 and the early 1970s
may have been, at least in part, a result of the decline in perceived
legitimacy of American social and governmental authority during this
turbulent period, which contained the civil rights movement and the
strident opposition to the war in Vietnam. The continuing uptrend
from 1970 to 1980 and the decline to 1985 are largely attributable to
the movement of the baby-boom generation into and then out of the

47. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL PANEL ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS,
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON

CRIME RATES, at vii (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
48. Alfred Blumstein, Prisons, in CRIME 387, 388 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds.,
1995).
49. For a review of that extensive literature, see Spelman, supra note 14, at 97.
50. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
REDIRECTING
RESOURCES
TowARD
TREATMENT,
NOT
CONTAINMENT
2
(2004),

http://www.psych.org/downloads/Mentallllness.pdf (reporting that in 1955, the state mental hospital
population was 559,000, but by 1999, it was less than 80,000).
51. Blumstein & Wallman, supra note 14, at 1-12.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 4-5,244.
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high-crime ages of the late teens and early twenties; this is reflected in
the general stability of violence rates within individual ages during
that period. The rise following the 1985 trough should almost
certainly be laid at the crack (smokable cocaine) epidemic and the
contagion of violence spawned by its markets, which became a major
factor in the urban problems of the late 1980s. The decline in the
1990s is a much more complicated story, which involves the
numerous
factors addressed in the subsequent chapters of this
54
volume.
Those chapters cover gun violence, drug markets, policing practices,
demographics, and prison population expansion-but nowhere mention the
asylum.
This is also true of the literature that focuses exclusively on the
incarceration-crime relationship.
When addressing the role of prison
populations, for example, Blumstein refers to the period from 1925 to 1975
as "a fifty-year period of impressive stability. 5 5 Blumstein discounts the
role of incarceration as too "simplistic," observing that, "[a]fter all, in the
1980s, during the period of the most prodigious growth in imprisonment,
violence was increasing most markedly., 56 (Incidentally, neither of these
statements is correct if we use an aggregated institutionalization measure).
More recently, Steven Levitt, in his review of the empirical literature on
crime, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that
Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, identifies the prison-population
build up as one of the four factors that explains the crime drop of the 1990s.
Levitt estimates that the increased prison population over the 1990s accounted for a 12% reduction of homicide and violent crime, and an 8%
reduction in property 57
crime-for a total of about one-third of the overall drop
in crime in the 1990s.
When Levitt extends his analysis to discuss the period 1973-1991,
however, he sticks to the prison population exclusively and does not even
consider the contribution of the declining mental hospital population.58 For
this reason, Levitt is surprised that the drop in crime did not start sooner. 59
Regarding the period 1973-1991, Levitt writes:
The one factor that dominates all others in terms of predicted impact
on crime in this earlier [1973-1991] period is the growth in the prison
population. Between 1973 and 1991, the incarceration rate more than
tripled, rising from 96 to 313 inmates per 100,000 residents. By my
estimates, that should have reduced violent crime and homicide by
54. Id. at 4.

55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Levitt, supra note 8, at 178-79.

58. Id. at 183-86.
59. Id. at 186.
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over 30 percent and property crime by more than 20 percent. Note
that this predicted impact of incarceration is much larger than for the
latter [1990s] period.6 °
Based on prison data alone, Levitt is left With a significant gap between
projected and actual crime rates for the period 1973-1991. "[I]n contrast to
the 1990s, the actual crime experience in the 1973-1991 period is not well
explained by the set of factors analyzed in this paper. There appears to be a
substantial unexplained rise in crime over the period 1973-1991. "61

Levitt

finds this surprising given the important effect of incarceration in the 1990s.
"In the light of the estimates linking increased incarceration to lower crime, it
is perhaps surprising that the rising prison population 62of the 1980s did not
induce a commensurate decline in crime in that period.",
Levitt concludes: "The real puzzle in my opinion, therefore, is not why
crime fell in the 1990s, but why it did not start falling sooner., 63 The answer
to that puzzle, though, may well be mental hospitalizations-which, if included in the measure of confinement, would significantly alter the trend
from 1973 to 1991. If the value of interest is institutional incapacitation, then
imprisonment may not capture it all.
III. Measuring Confinement and'Exploring Some Implications
In this Part, I turn to the empirical evidence. I present data on the
aggregated institutionalization rate for the United States and explore the
relationship between that measure of confinement and homicide rates.
A. Aggregating Mental Hospital and PrisonData
The first task, a simple one, is to aggregate time-series data on the
population of mental institutions and prisons-to create an aggregated
institutionalization rate. In order to construct such a measure, I draw first on
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the number of prisoners under
the jurisdiction of state and federal prisons from 1925 to 2004. For data on
mental health populations, I draw on several different sources, including the
U.S. Department of Commerce publication Patients in Hospitalsfor Mental
Disease,64 the Center for Mental Health Services' Mental Health report,65

60. Id. at 184.
61. Id. at 186.
62. Id. at 179 n.7.
63. Id. at 186.
64. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS FOR
MENTAL DISEASE, 1946, at 53 (1948); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS FOR MENTAL DISEASE, 1937, at 2 (1939); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS FOR MENTAL DISEASE, 1936, at 2, 3 (1938);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS FOR MENTAL
DISEASE, 1935, at 2 (1937); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATIENTS IN
HOSPITALS FOR MENTAL DISEASE, 1933, at 16 (1935).
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Gerald Grob's From Asylum to Community,66 and an article by Howard
Goldman and his colleagues.6 7 The resulting data set on mental health
populations is nevertheless still missing seventeen values over the seventytwo year period from 1928 to 2000, so I have linearly interpolated the missing observations. In order to compute the rate of institutionalization per
100,000 adults over age fifteen, I use general population data from the U.S.
Census Bureau, CurrentPopulationReports.68
Because there are no reliable statistics on jail populations-in most
cases, no data at all-for the period before 1970, I have not included jail
population data in the aggregated institutionalization numbers. In the
Appendix, I discuss jail data and replicate my models using the best available
jail data. The results essentially do not change. But because the data on jail
populations are so weak, I have not included them in the body of this Article.
The resulting time-series for the rate of aggregated institutionalization,
as compared to the rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons, is
represented in Figure 3 below.

65. CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL
HEALTH,
UNITED
STATES,
2002,
at
252
tbl.5
(1998),
available
at
http://www.mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/media/KEN/pdf/SMAO1-3938/MHUS02 Chapter 18.pdf;
CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 1998, at 151 (1998).
66. GERALD N. GROB, FROM ASYLUM TO COMMUNITY: MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN MODERN

AMERICA 258-69 (1991).
67. Howard H. Goldman et al., Deinstitutionalization:The Data Demythologized, 34 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129, 132 tbl.2 (1983) (compiling data on state and county mental
hospitals 1950-1980).
68. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports: Historical
National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999 (June 28, 2000),
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/opclockest.txt.
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Figure 3: Institutionalization versus incarceration in the United States (per
100,000 adults)
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As Figure 3 demonstrates, the trend for aggregated institutionalization
for the period 1928-1980 differs significantly from the trend for
incarceration alone over that period.
B. Exploring the Relationship between Institutionalization and Homicide
Rates
Anyone who has spent time looking at the homicide trends for the
twentieth century will immediately recognize that the aggregated
institutionalization rate from Figure 3 is an inverted plot-or mirror imageof the homicide trend line during the twentieth century. This is visually represented earlier in Figure 2, which I reproduce again here.
Figure 2: Institutionalization and homicide rates (per 100,000 adults)
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The correlation between the aggregated institutionalization and
homicide rates is remarkably high: -0.78. This is reflected in the following
scatterplot, Figure 4, which plots the observations for each year between
1928 and 2000 (holding constant, as I discuss in a moment, unemployment
and youth demographic change).
Figure 4: Institutionalization and homicide rate scatterplot
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1. Prais-Winsten Regression Model.-The relevant data here involve
time series, and as a result are highly autocorrelated-the value in the time
series at any one time depends heavily on the value in the preceding time(s).
In order to adjust for autocorrelation, I employ a Prais-Winsten regression
model with an autocorrelation adjustment of one time lag. 69 The PraisWinsten model essentially eliminates most of the autocorrelation (which is
measured on a scale from 0 to 4 by the Durbin-Watson statistic, 0 being
highly positively interrelated data, 2 showing no autocorrelation, and 4 being
highly negatively interrelated data).7 ° In addition, I compare the results I
obtain against a Cochrane-Orcutt regression model, which was an earlier
method intended to achieve the same result. 71 These are straightforward
69. The Prais-Winsten model, which corrects for first-order autocorrelated error, fits this data.
The correlogram (autocorrelation function plot) and partial correlogram (partial autocorrelation
function plot) of the residuals from the regression analysis reveal that an ARI effect is the only
statistically significant and reliable time series error component. As a result, an AR1 model that
eliminates the autocorrelated error at lag 1 fits the data best, and there is no need to use a more
complex time series error model.
70. For an extensive explanation of the Prais-Winsten model, see CHARLES W. OSTROM, JR.,
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS: REGRESSION TECHNIQUES 31-39 (Sage Publ'ns, 2d ed. 1990) (1978).
71. For an extensive explanation of the Cochrane-Orcutt model, see id. at 33.
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models used by many researchers in the study of time-series data. Apart
from the adjustment for autocorrelation, the regression model is simple: the
aggregate homicide rate serves as the dependant variable, and the rate of institutionalization and other control variables are the regressors.
The control variables that I employ consist of three leading structural
covariates for homicide: the unemployment rate, the changing age structure
of the United States, and the poverty rate. I run several models that take
account of each individually, as well as the combined effect of these other
indicators. A word about each of the three controls:
a. Unemployment.-A tremendous amount of research has been
conducted on the relationship between rates of crime and unemployment. At
a theoretical level, a range of behavioral assumptions (from rational action
theory to strain and conflict theories) intuitively suggest that being unemployed may increase the motivation for crime.72 On the other hand, as David
Cantor and Kenneth Land suggest, increased unemployment may also decrease the opportunity for criminal activity by reducing crime targets
(employed people with money circulating in the neighborhood).7 3
The empirical research on the unemployment-crime nexus has been
mixed and inconsistent, and, as a result, different schools of thought have
developed on the salience of unemployment. Some, such as James Q.
Wilson and James Alan Fox, discount the relationship completely, arguing
that unemployment has little or no effect on crime rates.74 Others, however,
are less categorical. In a thorough review of the research literature, Rates of
Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate Research Evidence,
Theodore G. Chiricos analyzes the findings from 63 studies containing 288
estimates of the crime-unemployment relationship, and concludes that there
is a conditional relationship.75 Chiricos summarizes his findings:

72. See Susan M. Carlson & Raymond J. Michalowski, Crime, Unemployment, and Social
Structures of Accumulation: An Inquiry into Historical Contingency, 14 JUST. Q. 209, 209 (1997)
("The proposition that increases in unemployment will generate increases in crime has long been

accepted as a basic tenet of the macro sociology of crime and delinquency."); Harold L. Votey, Jr.,
Employment, Age, Race, and Crime: A Labor Theoretic Investigation, 7 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 123, 151 (1991) (arguing that since "unemployment and/or working shortened

periods are associated with increased participation in crime... [the] availability of labor-market
opportunities can reduce the tendency to participate in crime").
73. David Cantor & Kenneth C. Land, Unemployment and Crime Rates in the Post-World War
H United States: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 317, 320-21 (1985).
74. JAMES ALAN Fox, FORECASTING CRIME DATA 29 (1978) ("The absence of an impact of

the unemployment rate on the rate of crime appears at this time to be unequivocal."); JAMES Q.
WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 312-13 (1985).
75. Theodore G. Chiricos, Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate
Research Evidence, 34 SOC. PROBS. 187, 188 (1987); see also Unemployment and Crime: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong. app. 2 at 601-26

(1978) (report by Robert W. Gillespie, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois,
Urbana, Ill.) (reviewing twenty-one studies and finding a modest conditional relationship); Richard
B. Freeman, Crime and Unemployment, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 89-106 (James Q. Wilson
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[f]or all crimes combined, the U-C relationship is three times more
likely to be positive than negative (75/25 percent) and more than 15
times as likely to be significant/positive as significant/negative (31/2
percent). More meaningful, of course, are comparisons of U-C
findings for specific types of crime. Table 1 reveals that property
crimes are more likely than violent crimes to produce positive results
(85/64 percent) and significant/positive results (40/22 percent). 76
One of the main difficulties in studying the unemployment-crime nexus
concerns measurement. The official rate of unemployment reported by
governmental agencies typically includes only those persons who have been
looking for work during the past month or months, but does not include persons who have given up their job search or have never looked for work. The
latter are not considered to be within the labor force, and therefore are not
considered unemployed. 7 Naturally, this complicates matters significantly
and suggests that official unemployment data may only work as a proxy for
the condition of the labor force.
Because of the basic structure of my institutionalization data-national
data collected annually that covers the whole adult population-there are few
choices to be made regarding the unemployment data. It turns out, though,
that this is not the method of analysis that produces the most highly consistent positive results in the unemployment context. In fact, annual aggregated
data are possibly the least favorable to the unemployment explanation: national level data show less consistently strong results than sub-national,
violent crime is less strong than property crime, and long-term data is less
strong than more recent data since the 1970s. Nevertheless, it is still important to factor in the effect of unemployment.
The measure I have chosen is the official unemployment rate reported
by the U.S. Census and Department of Labor, which consists of the percentage of the civilian labor force that is unemployed, in thousands of persons
sixteen years old and over (prior to 1947, fourteen years old and over), annual averages. For these data, I have drawn on the U.S. Census Bureau's
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 for the

ed., 1983) (reviewing eighteen studies and concluding that the relationship is modest and
insufficient to explain the upward trend in crime); Sharon K. Long & Ann D. Witte, Current
Economic Trends: Implicationsfor Crime and CriminalJustice, in CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN A DECLINING ECONOMY 69, 70 (Kevin N. Wright ed., 1981) (reviewing sixteen studies involving
unemployment and finding a modest conditional relationship).
76. Chiricos, supra note 75, at 192.
77. Id. at 187 n.1.
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period 1925-197078 and on data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics for the period 1940-2004. 79
b. Demographics.-Another privileged explanation for long-term
crime trends is the demographic-change hypothesis. 80 The central intuition
here is that variations in the composition of the population consisting of
higher offending subgroups (such as fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old males)
will have significant effects on the overall societal crime rate. From this
compositional effects perspective, the three central axes of demographic concern are age, gender, and race. This flows from research that consistently
shows that, at the individual level, "young people, males, and members of
disadvantaged minorities are at comparatively high risk of becoming
offenders and victims, at least with respect to the common 'street' crimes.
Research consistently attributes a large portion of the rise in crime
during the 1960s to the post-World War II baby boom which spanned the
period 1946-1964 and produced a large number of high-risk persons aged
fourteen to twenty-four during the 1960s and 1970s. 82 There is debate,
though, over the extent of the influence as well as over how to interpret the
results. Lawrence Cohen and Kenneth Land studied the relationship between
the proportion of the population between fifteen and twenty-four and variations in homicide and auto theft rates, and found a highly significant
statistical relationship accounting for a substantial fraction of the change. 3
In contrast, Steven Levitt conducted a study titled The Limited Role of
Changing Age Structure in Explaining Aggregate Crime Rates, and found
that "the changing age distribution can explain only 10-20% of the dramatic
rise in crime observed between 1960 and 1980.,,84 Levitt characterizes this

78. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE

U.S.:
COLONIAL
TIMES
TO
1970
(1975),
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970pl -01.pdf.

available

at

79. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEYS:

EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, JANUARY
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2005.pdf.

2006,

at

203

tbl.1

(2006),

available at

80. See generally James Alan Fox, Demographicsand US. Homicide, in THE CRIME DROP IN
AMERICA, supra note 14, at 288, 288 ("[C]rime statistics that overlook differences by demography
can easily lead to misinterpretation.").
81. Scott J. South & Steven F. Messner, Crime and Demography: Multiple Linkages,
ReciprocalRelations, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 83, 84 (2000).
82. Alfred Blumstein & Daniel S. Nagin, Analysis ofArrest Rates for Trends in Criminality, 9
SoCIo-ECON. PLAN. SCt. 221, 221-22 (1975); John H. Laub, Urbanism, Race, and Crime, 20 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 183, 192-94 (1983).

83. Lawrence E. Cohen & Kenneth C. Land, Age Structure and Crime: Symmetry Versus
Asymmetry and the Projection of Crime Rates Through the 1990s, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 170, 172-75
(1987).
84. Steven D. Levitt, The Limited Role of Changing Age Structure in Explaining Aggregate
Crime Rates, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 581, 582 (1999).
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as "a limited impact., 85 James Alan Fox and Alex Piquero contend that
about 10% of the drop in crime in the 1990s was due to changing demographics and refer to this as "deadly demographics." 8 6 So the estimates and
especially the interpretations vary significantly.
Here, too, there are different methods and choices in analyzing the
demographic change hypothesis. The simplest approach is to regress the
crime rates using demographic and other variables as regressors. In a review
of ninety such studies, Thomas Marvell and Carlisle Moody report that only
a small number of the studies found significant relationships.87 Again,
however, given my institutionalization and homicide data, this is the only
feasible approach here. Other approaches include computing and comparing
hypothetical rates of disaggregated
group-offending based on different
88
population compositions.
The population data I use are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau,
Current Population Reports.89 Based on the data from those reports, I
calculate the percentage of the total population represented by fifteen- to
twenty-four-year-olds. A couple of caveats regarding the data: first, beginning in 1959, the populations of Alaska and Hawaii are included in the data,
resulting in a 750,000 person increase in the population (or 4.2%) that year.
Also, the population estimates are all July estimates. Since there is going to
be a slight time discrepancy, I have decided to lag this variable: in the statistical analysis, I use July 1927 population data in the regression to represent
December 31, 1927, population. Finally, the population estimates for the
period 1940 to 1979 include Armed Forces overseas, whereas the earlier and
later periods do not; however, this should not skew the analysis because of
the large number of military personnel abroad during World War II and the
Korean and Vietnam Wars.
c. Poverty.-The third and last control variable in the models is the
rate of poverty. In their seminal study, Structural Covariates of Homicide
Rates: Are There Any Invariances Across Time and Social Space?, Kenneth
Land, Patricia McCall, and Lawrence Cohen review twenty-one of the
leading homicide studies and find that "[b]y far, the strongest and most
invariant effect is due to the resource-deprivation/affluence index;
consistently across the four decennial census periods, cities, metropolitan
85. Id. at 581.
86. James Alan Fox & Alex R. Piquero, Deadly Demographics:Population Characteristicsand
ForecastingHomicide Trends, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 339, 354 (2003).
87. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Age Structure and Crime Rates: The Conflicting
Evidence, 7 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 237, 250-54 (1991).
88. See Levitt, supra note 84 (attempting to estimate future total crime rates by breaking down
the population into distinct age groups, calculating the crime rates of each group, and then
predicting future crime rates based on the changing proportion of each group in the total
population).
89. See supra note 68.
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areas, or states that are more deprived have higher homicide rates, and those
that are more affluent have lower rates." 90 The trick again, however, is measuring poverty. The most widely used method is to rely on the official Census
count of the percentage of households (families) below the poverty line.
Since this is often highly correlated with other indicators of socio-economic
status, some researchers create an index for resource deprivation. However,
in order to avoid biases in the construction of the index, I use the official
poverty rate directly from the U.S. Census Bureau. 91 The rates are only
available from 1959 onwards, when the poverty line was first measured-so
the regressions including this variable use a smaller number of observations
(N = 42, rather than 73 as in all the other regressions).
There are, of course, other popular explanations for major recent crime
trends, but they do not tend to explain both the earlier increase in crime in the
1960s and the drop in the 1990s. So, for instance, many point to the change
in street drug markets during the 1990s and the decline of crack cocaine con92
sumption as leading explanations for the sharp drop in crime in the 1990s.
Others point to the dispersion of activities away from the family and households in the period following World War 11. 93 And then, of course, there is
the abortion hypothesis.94 My models do not take account of these other
possible explanations.
2. Findings.-Table 1 shows that, regardless of the model specification,
the aggregated institutionalization rate has a statistically significant
correlation with the homicide rate, and that the contribution of
institutionalization is far more important than that of other statistically
significant control variables. So, for instance, looking at Model 4, which
holds constant unemployment and demographic changes, institutionalization
is at least two times more influential than unemployment (with a beta of
-0.876 versus 0.402 for unemployment). The Prais-Winsten coefficient of
-1.119 for institutionalization in Model 4 suggests that an increase in
institutionalization of 1 per 1,000 adults is likely to translate into a reduction
in the homicide rate of 1.119 per 100,000-with a 95% confidence level
ranging from -1.74 to -0.5.

90. Land et al., supra note 12, at 951.
91. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/povertyihistpovihstpovl3.html.

Historical

Poverty

Tables,

92. Bruce D. Johnson et al., The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug Markets, and Violence
in Inner-City New York, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 14, at 164, 196-97; Levitt,
supra note 8, at 176, 179-81.
93. Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine
Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 588, 604-05 (1979).
94. See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime,
116 Q.J. ECON. 379, 379 (2001) (offering evidence that legalized abortion has accounted for as
much as a fifty percent drop in crime).
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Institutionalization remains robust regardless of model specification. In
all but one case, it is statistically significant at the .001 level (and that one
case is significant at the .002 level), and broadly speaking, is in the same
range of influence. This is not entirely surprising because, in this case, the
two trends-aggregated institutionalization and homicide rates-are practically mirror images and thus are highly correlated. As a result, regardless of
the model, the finding likely will be statistically significant.
Table 1: The effect of aggregating institutionalization
on the incarceration-crime nexus:
Prais-Winsten autocorrelation adjustment at Lag 1 (ARI) regression results
Dependent variable = Homicide Rates, 1928-2000
Explanatory
variables:
Institutionalization:
Prais coefficient

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-1.085"**

-1.107"*

-1.067"*

-1.119**

-1.312"**

-1.723**

Standard error

(.264)

(.251)

P value

0.000

0.000

(.327)
0.002

(.309)
0.001

(.347)
0.001

(.44)
0.000

-.78

-.78

-.876

-.502

-.911

OLS beta
Unemployment:
Prais coefficient

.051**

.051**

.072

Standard error

(.025)

(.025)

(.102)

P value

0.042

0.043

0.484

.31

.402

.12

-.01

-.4

OLS beta
Proportion 15-24:
Prais coefficient

0.014

Standard error

(.149)

(.14)

(.196)

P value

0.924

0.946

0.049

OLS beta

-.009

-.219

-.58

Poverty:
Prais coefficient
Standard error

.046

-.081

P value

(.102)
0.654

(.114)
0.482

OLS beta

-. 417

-.364

Durbin-Watson
statistic pre-PraisWinsten
Durbin-Watson
statistic post-PraisWinsten
OLS R-squared
N
-

0.1319

0.186

0.1319

0.235

0.213

0.36

1.3278

1.4678

1.3244

1.47

1.051

1.156

0.609

0.706

0.609

0.736

0.647

0.832

42

42

73
73
statistically significant at 10% cutoff.

=

73
5% cutoff.

=

73
1% cutoff.
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The same cannot be said, though, of the relationship between the prison rate
alone (excluding mental health populations) and the national homicide rate.
Table 2 summarizes the results of Prais-Winsten regressions using similar
model specifications. As Table 2 demonstrates, the initial statistical relationship between prison and homicide rates vanishes quickly as soon as other
control variables, such as demographic change and poverty rates, are included in the models. It is fair to say, based on Table 2, that there is no
robust relationship between the long-term trends when prison rates, rather
than aggregated institutionalization rates, are used.
Overall, the analyses suggest that including mental health data in the
rate of institutionalization-rather than using prison rates only-is likely to
have significant effects on the study of the relationship in the United States
between confinement and crime during the twentieth century. Although it is
tempting to discuss incapacitation here, far more research is necessary before
we can begin to evaluate possible explanations for the relationship.
One additional comment: a problem with the analysis is that there may
be simultaneity bias. The relationship between crime and institutionalization
is likely to be two-way. Although increased institutionalization is likely to
decrease crime rates through incapacitation, increased crime is also likely to
increase institutionalization through convictions and sentencing. 95 As a
result, the incapacitation effect of institutionalization on crime is probably
diminished and the statistical estimates are likely to understate the effect-as
Levitt suggests, "perhaps dramatically." 96 But the effect of this bias, if there
is one, would only be to underestimate the effect of aggregated
institutionalization on crime, and that would only increase the effect of
aggregated institutionalization on homicide.

95. Levitt, supra note 9, at 322.
96. Id.
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Table 2
Using prison rates only in studying the incarceration-crime nexus:
Prais-Winsten autocorrelation adjustment at lag 1 (AR1) regression results
Dependent variable = Homicide Rates, 1928-2000
Explanatory
variables:
Prison Rate:
Prais coefficient

Model 1

Model 2

-.0073*

-.009"*

-.004

-.006

-.006

-.005

Standard error

(.004)

(.004)

(.004)

(.005)

(.004)

(.006)

P value

0.066

0.033

0.375

0.210

0.144

0.390

Unemployment:
Prais coefficient
Standard error
P value

Model 3

.053*
(.026)
0.048

Proportion 15-24:
Prais coefficient
Standard error
P value

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

.049*
(.026)

.158
(.123)

0.064

0.206

.225
(.171)

.191
(.169)

.05
(.316)

0.191

0.263

0.876

Poverty:
Prais coefficient

-.086

-.196

Standard error

(.109)

(.182)

P value
Durbin-Watson
statistic prePrais-Winsten
Durbin-Watson
statistic postPrais-Winsten
OLS R-squared

0.437

0.288

N
-

0.0669

0.0885

0.1385

0.136

0.194

0.612

1.109

1.221

1.127

1.229

0.947

0.992

0.0495

0.174

0.508

0.511

0.472

0.81

42

42

73
73
statistically significant at 10% cutoff.

=

73
5% cutoff.

73
= % cutoff.

3. Estimating the Effects.-Despite possible simultaneity bias, the
influence of aggregated institutionalization on the homicide rate is large and
robust. Based on the six models, we can estimate (using the 95% confidence
intervals) that the effect may be somewhere between a low of -0.415 and a
high of -2.014. This means that a one person increase in the rate of aggregated institutionalization per 1,000 adults (or an increase of 100 per 100,000)
is associated with a decrease in the homicide rate of between 0.4 and 2 persons per 100,000 adults-in a universe where the homicide rates have varied
between 4.5 and 10.7, with a mean of 7.4 over the period 1928-2000. A
summary of the 95% confidence intervals for the six models from Table 1
follows:

High
Low

1775

From the Asylum to the Prison

2006]

Model 2
-1.608
-0.605

Model I
-1.612
-0.559

Model 3
-1.072
-0.415

Model 5
-2.014
-0.609

Model 4
-1.736
-0.502

Model 6
-2.614
-0.831

Another way to estimate the possible effect is to go back to Steven
97
Levitt's review of crime trends in the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Recall that Levitt finds, based on his best estimates, that the elasticity of
crime with respect to the size of the prison population is -0.30 for homicide
and violent crime and -0.20 for property crime. 98 This leads Levitt to the
following estimates: 99
Incarceration rate

1990s

1973
1991

Homicide

Violent
cie
crime

Property
rie
crime

1991

I 2001

I Change

313

470

+50.2%

-12%

-12%

-8%

1973
96

1991
313

Change
+226%

-35%

-35%

-24%

Recall also that Levitt's estimates for homicide for the period 19731991 are off by a net 25%. Levitt's total estimated effect on homicide from
his 10 factors is -20%, but the actual number of homicides reported by the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) is up 5%.100 This leads Levitt to conclude that "[t]here appears to be a substantial unexplained rise in crime over
the period 1973-1991 .,,1
The unexplained difference vanishes, however, if we include mental
hospitalization in the aggregated institutionalization rate: the increase in
confinement from 1973 to 1991 would have been only 152 per 100,000, or
up 52% from a rate of 291 in 1973 to a rate of 443 in 1991. Based on
Levitt's estimates, this would have translated into a 12% decrease in
homicides, not a 35% decrease. Levitt's revised estimate for the total effect
of his ten factors on homicide during the 1973-1991 period would be an increase in homicides of 3%, which is not far from the actual reported change
In other words, using aggregated
in the UCR of a positive 5%.
institutionalization data rather than prison data would eliminate Levitt's
disparity regarding the change in homicides.

97. Levitt, supra note 8.

98. Id. at 178.
99. Id. at 178-79, 184.
100. Id. at 185 tbl.6.
101. Id. at 186.
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IV. Implications and Directions
Rethinking confinement through the lens of institutionalization puts the
incarceration revolution of the late twentieth century in a different light. If
hospitalization and prison rates are aggregated, the United States is only now
beginning to reach the levels of institutionalization that were commonplace
from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s. Naturally, this tells us nothing about
the proper amount of confinement in society, nor should it alter our perception or evaluation of the incarceration revolution of the late twentieth
century. What it does underscore, more than anything, is how much institutionalization there was in the 1930s through 1960s. Perhaps, then, it is the
continuity of confinement-and not only the most recent exponential increase in imprisonment-that we need to study empirically and explain.
The potential implications are significant for sociological,
criminological, and economic research into the incarceration-crime
relationship. 10 2 Rethinking confinement through the lens of aggregate
institutionalization also significantly impacts research in punishment theory,
such as studies that have attempted to operationalize and test the central insights of the Frankfurt School-specifically, Georg Rusche and Otto
Kirchheimer's suggestion in Punishment and Social Structure that penal
strategies are shaped by systems of economic production and fiscal
policies.' 0 3 A review of that literature suggests that there is empirical
plausibility to the Rusche-Kirchheimer hypothesis. 10 4 To date, though, the
research has focused only on imprisonment rates.
For instance, in Unemployment, Imprisonment, and Social Structures of
Accumulation: Historical Contingency in the Rusche-Kirchheimer
Hypothesis, Raymond Michalowski and Susan Carlson refine the test of the
Rusche-Kirchheimer hypothesis by periodizing the analysis. 0 5 Drawing on
recent theories about shifts in social structures of accumulation (SSAs) in the
United States during the twentieth century, the authors break down the years
between 1933 and 1992 into four periods: (1) a period of economic
102. This includes not only studies of incapacitation and deterrence, but also research that
studies the influence of crime rates on incarceration rates. Much of this work uses data from the
early 1970s. See, e.g., Marc Ouimet & Pierre Tremblay, A Normative Theory of the Relationship
Between Crime Rates and Imprisonment Rates: An Analysis of the Penal Behavior of the U.S. States
from 1972 to 1992, 33 J. CRIME & DELINQ. 109, 111 (1996) (comparing crime rates to
imprisonment levels across states and time periods). Here too, aggregating mental hospitalization
rates would have a significant effect.
103.

GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 7

(Transaction Publishers 2003) (1939) (claiming that fiscal motives have given rise to the most
common forms of punishment in modem society).
104. See Theodore G. Chiricos & Miriam A. Delone, Labor Surplus andPunishment: A Review
and Assessment of Theory and Evidence, 39 SOC. PROBS. 421, 431 (1992) (finding an "empirically
plausible" relationship of labor surplus to punishment).
105. Raymond J. Michalowski & Susan M. Carlson, Unemployment, Imprisonment, and Social
Structures of Accumulation: Historical Contingency in the Rusche-Kirchheimer Hypothesis, 37
CRIMINOLOGY 217 (1999).
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exploration from 1933 to 1947 marked by high levels of structural
unemployment, labor conflict, and worker displacement, that led to the
emergence of social institutions (welfare state policies and labor accords)
that have come to be known as Fordist;' 0 6 (2) a period of economic
consolidation from 1948 to 1966 marked by increasing economic output,
upward trends in real wages, and decreasing unemployment; 10 7 (3) a period
of decay from 1967 to 1979 marked by increasing unemployment, eroding
labor accords, and the oil crisis of 1973;108 and (4) a period of renewed economic exploration from 1980 to 1992 marked by significant displacement of
young men, a shift away from social welfare strategies, and the growth of the
service industry, that some have called the beginning of the post-Fordist
period.' 0 9
Using only imprisonment rates, the authors find a weak, though
statistically significant, impact of unemployment on prison admissions
during the first period (exploration); 1° and a strong impact of unemployment
on prison admissions during the third period (decay)."' The trouble is, both
of those periods are marked by stability of incarceration but instability of
institutionalization. Using aggregated institutionalization data, the first period is characterized by a dramatic increase in the institutionalized
population, and the third period is marked by an exponential decrease in
institutionalization.
In other words, things look very different if we
conceptualize confinement through the larger prism of institutionalization.
Studies of the relationship between
education, incarceration, and crime, also
12
would be significantly affected."
A. Different Populations
One natural objection is that the different populations-prison and
asylum-are so very different. Although there may be some overlap at the
margin, it is hard to believe that the same people who were
106. Id. at 224.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 238.

See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons
and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (1998) (analyzing the

tradeoff between investment in early education social programs, such as Head Start, and crime);
Brian A. Jacobs & Lars Lefgren, Are Idle Hands the Devil's Workshop?: Incapacitation,

Concentration, and Juvenile Crime, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1560, 1561 (2003) (analyzing the shortterm effects of school on juvenile crime); Lance Lochner, Education, Work, and Crime: A Human
Capital Approach, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 811, 827-28 (2004) (comparing longitudinal data on
education and employment with incidence of incarceration); Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The
Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM.

ECON. REV. 155, 156 (2004) (studying the relationship between state compulsory schooling laws
and the probability of incarceration).
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deinstitutionalized would end up in prison. The continuity thesis is, in this
sense, shocking to our sensibilities about the "insane" and the "criminal."
This raises the question of the interdependence of the two populations, an
area that has received some research attention.
In a 1984 study, Henry Steadman, John Monahan, and their colleagues
tested the degree of reciprocity between the mental health and prison systems
in the wake of state mental hospital deinstitutionalization. 1 3 They used both
a comparative and longitudinal approach. Their study randomly selected a
total of 3,897 male prisoners and 2,376 adult male admittees to state mental
hospitals from six different states, half from 1968 and the other half from
1978.114 They gathered full institutional histories for arrests, imprisonment,
and state mental hospitalization for each inmate and then compared the system overlap between 1968 and 1978."' They were able, thus, to measure the
extent of cross-institutionalization-the change in the number of prisoners
with prior mental health contacts, as well as the change in mental health patients with criminal records.
Regarding the number and proportion of prison admittees with one or
more prior mental hospitalizations, Steadman and Monahan found significant
variation between the six states. Texas experienced a huge increase.
California and Iowa had increases as well, but New York, Arizona, and
Massachussetts experienced proportional declines." 6 Naturally, it was a period of rapid expansion in the prison population, with prison admissions up
42.4% for the six states from 1968 to 1978.117 During that period, the overall
number of prisoners in the six states with prior hospitalization almost
doubled, up 97.3%.118 Consolidating their tables, 9 and calculating total
figures, their findings can be summarized as follows:"

113. Steadman et al., supra note 6.
114. Id. at 478.
115. Id.

116. Id. at 481 tbl.2.
117. Id. at 480 tb. 1.
118. Id. at 481 tbl.2.
119. Id. at 480 tbl.1, 481 tbl.2, 482 tbl.3.

Prison admittees
with prior
hospitalization
(in %)

Prison admittees with prior
hospitalization

NY
CA
AZ
TX
IA
MA
Total
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1968
741
1,069
35
18
64
54
1,981

J

1978
797
1,777
39
1,004
153
139
3,909

]

% Change
+7.6
+66.2
+11.4
+5,477.8
+139.1
+157.4
+97.3

1968
12.1
9.5
3.9
0.3
7.7
12.5

[

7.7[

1978
9.3
15.2
2.2
8.4
16.7
9.0
10.7

J

Expected
1978
number
using 1968

Difference
actual
versus
expected

percentages

(in %)

1,037
1,111
69
35
71
194
2,517

-23.1
+59.9
-43.5
+2,768.6
+115.5
-28.4
+55.3

]

Because three states (New York, Arizona, and Massachusetts)
experienced relative declines-that is, taking into account the increase in the
prison population-Steadman and Monahan concluded from these data that
there was little evidence of movement from the mental hospitals to prisons:
"the percentage of former patients among the ranks of prison admittees decreased in as many study states as it increased."' 120 Thus, "[l]ittle evidence
was found to support the idea that mental hospital deinstitutionalization was
a significant factor in the rise of prison populations during th[e] period [from
1968 to 1978]. ' '121
On the other side of the equation, Steadman and Monahan did find
evidence that mental hospitals were becoming more "criminal. 122 Holding
constant the changes in total mental hospital admissions for the six stateswhich were down 9% from 1968 to 1978-the number of mental hospital
admittees with one or more prior arrests increased by an average 40.3%, and
the number with a prior imprisonment increased on average by 60.4%. "In
all study states but Iowa, the actual number of hospital admittees with one or
11.7% to 99.9%) than would
more prior arrests is substantially higher ' (from
23
be expected from total admission trends."'
My interpretation of their prison data is less sanguine. Although the
state-by-state breakdown is even, the aggregated numbers tell a different
story. The number of inmates with prior mental hospitalization is more than
50% higher than would have been expected given the prison growth. 124 To
be sure, it does not account for all of the prison expansion. In this sense,
Steadman and Monahan are undoubtedly right: the evidence does not show

120. Id. at 483.
121. Id. at 490.
122. Id. at487.
123. Id. at486.
124. Id. at 482.
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that deinstitutionalization explains the prison explosion. It does not establish
direct transfer from the asylum to the penitentiary. But there may be significant overlap and, over time, more substitution. The proportion has increased
by more than half. It is consistent
at least with some interdependence. The
125
real question is, how much?
Steven Raphael tackles this question using an econometric model in his
paper The Deinstitutionalizationof the Mentally Ill and Growth in the U.S.
Prison Populations: 1971 to 1996.126 Raphael tests the relationship between
mental hospitalization and prison populations using state-level data for the
period 1971 to 1996. What he finds, across his six different models, is that
the mental hospitalization rate has a statistically significant and robust negative effect on prison rates. 2 7 Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is large;
and ranges from a low of a seven-person decline to a high of a two-person
decline in mental hospitalization resulting in a one-person increase in the
prison rate. 128 Translated into actual population numbers, Raphael's findings
suggest that deinstitutionalization from 1971 to 1996 resulted in between
48,000 and 148,000 additional state prisoners in 1996, which according to
Raphael, "accounts for 4.5 to 14 percent of the total prison population for this
year and for roughly 28 to 86 percent of prison inmates suffering from mental illness. ' 129 What we also know is that, at the close of the twentieth
century, there was a high level of mentally ill offenders in prisons and jails in
the United States-283,800
in 1998-representing 16% of jail and state
1 30
prison inmates.

B. Back to Social Theory
The problem with these empirical analyses, though, is that again they
take too literally the official categories of the "mentally ill" and of the
"criminal." The diagnosis and documentation of mental illness needs to be
problematized, as does the guilty verdict. The studies in effect put too much
credence in the official labels. These categories are not natural and do not
have independent validity and objective signification. The question is not,
how many people with mental illness are in the criminal justice system?
Rather, the question should be, has the criminal justice system caught in its
125. Another problem with their analysis is that the reduction in mental health care starting in
the 1960s may itself reduce the number of mental health contacts for individuals who end up in
prison. Measuring the interdependence of the two populations based on prior mental hospitalization
will not capture mental illness properly if there is less and less care that leaves traces on the general
population.
126. Raphael, supra note 7.

127. Id. at 8-9, 10-11.
128. Id. at 9.

129. Id. at 12.
130. PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND THE TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 3 (1999),

availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf.
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wider net the type of people at the margin of society-the class of deviants
from predominant social norms-who used to be caught up in the asylum
and mental hospital? The real challenge is to deconstruct both the categories
of the "insane" and of the "criminal" simultaneously.
The first is easy. With regard to the asylum, we are all constructivists
today. We all accept the claim that criminality was medicalized in the early
twentieth century. As Liska and Markowitz suggest, correctly, "During the
first half of the 20th century, psychiatrists medicalized social problems, successfully arguing that the cause of many social problems, like crime, lies in
the psychological malfunctioning of people and that the solution lies in their
treatment by medical specialists in treatment centers." 131 Or as William
Gronfein explains:
In Goffman's words, "part of the official mandate of the public mental
hospital is to protect the community from the danger and nuisance of
certain kinds of misconduct." Publicly supported insane asylums
represented an uneasy, albeit surprisingly successful, marriage
between asylum and prison, a fact that was of particular importance in
contributing to their long-term growth. 12
We all agree that the category of the "insane" was created in modem times to
capture the deviant and marginal. But in order to make sense of the larger
trend in institutionalization, we need to view the "criminal" through the same
prism. Is it possible that the category of the present-day criminal does the
same work that used to be done by the category of the insane? Might it capture the same class of norm violators, the same kind of deviants?
Certainly there are important demographic differences. The gender
distribution, for instance, was far more even in mental hospitals than in
prisons. In 1966, for example, there were 560,548 first-time admissions to
mental hospitals, of which 310,810 (55.4%) were male and 249,738 (or
44.6%) were female. 133 In contrast, new admittees to state and federal prison
were consistently 95% male throughout the twentieth century. 34 There were
also sharp differences in racial and age compositions, which I discuss next.
But within the demographic group-within the set of male inmates, for
instance-could the categories have served the same function, at least
roughly? Steadman and Monahan gesture at this in their study, suggesting
that the relationship between the mental health and prison systems may be
indirect, "mediated by community reaction towards all types of socially

131. Liska et al., supra note 6, at 1747.
132. Gronfein, supra note 42, at 194 (quoting GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 352).
133. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 1967 MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES

REPORT 10 tbl.C (1969).
134. MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN,

BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984, at 66 (1986).
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marginal groups when the societal tolerance level for deviance is
exceeded., 135 This is one direction for research to pursue.
And how does race figure into the equation, since it is such an important
part of the incarceration expansion-since the prison has become, as Loi'c
Wacquant suggests, the last of our peculiar institutions? 136 There is some
evidence to suggest that the proportion of minorities in mental hospitals was
increasing during deinstitutionalization. From 1968 to 1978, for instance,
there was already a demographic shift among mental hospital admittees. In
Steadman and Monahan's data, for instance, the proportion of non-whites
increased from 18.3% in 1968 to 31.7% in 1978: "Across the six states
studied, the mean age at hospital admission decreased from 39.1 in 1968 to
33.3 by 1978. The percentage of whites among admitted patients also
decreased, from 81.7% in 1968 to 68.3% in 1978.' ' 7 There was a less stark
shift in prison admissions data, though the direction of change was the same:
"Across the six states, the mean age of prison admittees was 29.0 in 1968 and
28.1 in 1978. The percentage of whites among prison admittees was also
relatively stable, decreasing only from 57.6% in 1968 to 52.3% in 1978."' 38
At the national level, though, the racial shift in prison admissions began
well before 1968. In fact, throughout the twentieth century, African
Americans have represented a consistently increasing proportion of the state
and federal prison populations. Since 1926, the year the federal government
began collecting data on correctional populations, the proportion of African
Americans newly admitted to state prisons has increased steadily from 23%
in 1926 to 46% in 1982.139 It reached 51.8% in 1991 and stood at 47% in
1997.140 This trend is illustrated in Figure 5 below:

135. Steadman et al., supra note 6, at 490.
136. LoYc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3
PUNISHMENT & SOc'Y 95, 98-99 (2001).

137. Steadman et al., supra note 6, at 479.

138. Id.
139. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACE OF PRISONERS ADMITTED
TO STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, 1926-86, at 5 (1991).
140. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS

IN
THE
UNITED
STATES-1997,
at
10
tbl. 1.20
(2000),
available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpus97.pdf (reporting a total of 164,300 black admissions out
of 317,237 total admissions to state prisons in 1991 and 157,300 out of 334,525 in 1997).
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Figure 5: Admissions to state prisons
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In 1978, African Americans represented 44% of newly admitted inmates
in state prisons. 14 1 That same year, minorities represented 31.7% of newly
admitted patients in mental hospitals-up from 18.3% in 1968.142 Is it possible that, as the population in mental hospitals became increasingly African
American and young, our society gravitated toward the prison rather than the
mental hospital as the proper way to deal with at-risk populations? This too
would require further investigation.
Overall, it is the differences and the gradual changes in the demographic
composition of the two populations that stick out. The mental hospitalization
population was far more evenly distributed along gender lines, was an older
population, and tended to be more white. But the demographic distributions
changed over time, and this gradual change calls for explanation. It also significantly affects our interpretation of the possible relationship between
institutionalization and homicide. After all, the mental hospital population
was largely female, 143 and statistically women are far less likely to be violent
offenders.' 4 How then could there be any continuity in the effect on serious
violent crime? And if there is indeed a continuing effect, might that suggest
that the present prison population also includes a sizeable portion of low-risk
offenders? Is it possible that the women in the mental hospitalization populations have been replaced by non-violent drug offenders in the prison
populations? Also, if there is indeed a relationship, does it suggest that the
type of institutionalization doesn't matter: regardless of whether we use

141. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 139, at 5.
142. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
143. For example, in Massachusetts 1939-1941, 20-29 year-old males had a mental hospital
first admission rate of 124.2 persons per 100,000 males, whereas 20-29 year-old females had a first
admission rate of 91.1 per 100,000. GROB, supra note 37, at 184 tbl.7-3.
144. See, e.g., Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
BULL., Oct. 2005, at 9 tbl.12, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf (indicating
that only 26,300 out of 624,900 violent offenders (4.2%) in 2002 were female).

1784

Texas Law Review

mental hospitals or prisons, we achieve the same result?
militate in favor of returning to a medicalized model?
V.

[Vol. 84:1751

If so, does this

Rethinking Confinement

Today, the categories of "mental illness" and "criminality"-and the
corresponding populations of the mental hospital and the prison-seem so
distinct, so different, so particular. With the exception of the 7% to 16% of
prison inmates who are suffering from mental illness, 145 it seems so wrong
and confused to mix the categories. It seems almost insulting to aggregate
the two populations into one variable. But is it? Will later generations question our inability to see the continuity of spatial exclusion and confinement?
Will they object to the balkanization of research on forms of social control?
Will they reexamine our categories?
I suspect they will. It may be time, then, to rethink the category of
confinement through the larger lens of institutionalization and to begin to
trace that broader history of institutional incapacitation in twentieth century
United States. Of course, the story may be even more complicated. Perhaps
I have not even begun to scratch the surface of institutionalization. After all,
Goffman included the military in the set of total institutions. 146 Should we
add the armed forces as part of our institutionalization count? Also, in the
mental health area, many of the persons who were deinstitutionalized moved
into private facilities. As William Gronfein writes, "many former patients
have been 'transinstitutionalized' rather than deinstitutionalized, moving
from state-supported asylums to privately run nursing homes or board-andcare homes."' 147 Should we include nursing homes as well? And how about
universities? How exactly should we define institutionalization? Where do
we place the contour of the total institution?
One last question. If indeed aggregated institutionalization explains the
bulk of violent crime trends, then what should we make of all those other
socio-cultural and political explanations of deviance-theories of deviant
subcultures, disorderliness, social disorganization, collective efficacy,
anomie, social conflict, to name but a few? If the dominant factor is simply
the rate of total institutionalization qua incapacitation-if we are really
dealing only with social physics-how then should we understand other
criminological theories?
145. DITTON, supra note 130, at 1.
146. GOFFMAN, supranote 1, at 5.
147. Gronfein, supra note 42, at 193. Gerald Grob notes that "much of the decline in the
number of patients in mental hospitals was more apparent than real. During the 1960s the number
of mental patients in chronic nursing homes rose precipitously as states attempted to reduce their
expenditures by taking advantage of new federal programs." GROB, supra note 37, at 317. So, for
instance, whereas mental hospital populations decreased sharply and rapidly from over 500,000 in
1963 to under 370,000 seven years later in 1970, "the number of individuals with mental disorders
in chronic nursing homes increased from 221,721 to 426,712 (of which 367,586 were aged sixtyfive or older)." Id.
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Appendix
A note on jail data and their effect
There are no reliable statistics on jail populations-in most cases, no
data at all-for the period before 1970. That is the year that the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) conducted the first census
of jails. 148 Prior to that, there were decennial Census Bureau counts for 1880,
1890, 1940, 1950, and 1960, but even those Census counts are not reliable.
For instance, in 1970, the Census reported 129,189 inmates in jail, whereas
the first Department of Justice LEAA count that same year reported 160,863
inmates in jail-24.5% higher than the Census count. 149 In addition, between
1904 and at least 1940, the Census counted only jail inmates who were
sentenced.150 The 1923 special report, "Prisoners, 1923," also excluded
inmates who were not sentenced and omitted certain jails that were believed
not to contain sentenced jail inmates.' 5' All that data, including the 1933
"County and52 City Jails" report, excluded jail inmates who had not been sentenced yet.1
There are a number of reasons for the underreporting and non-reporting
of jail inmates. Jails are jurisdictionally at the municipal and county level
and, as a result, are much more difficult to survey than, for instance, federal
prisons. Nevertheless, it is important to reconstruct some measure of prison
populations. From 1940 to 1950, according to the Census count, the jail
population was decreasing, down almost 13,000, or 13%, from 99,249 in
1940 to 86,492 in 1950. 153 Again, though, the 1970 LEAA count and
comparison to the 1970 Census count suggests that these numbers may have
been off by as much as 25%. If we make very conservative assumptions and
assume (1) that the jail population stayed flat from 1928 to 1940 (recall, it
was dropping from 1940 to 1950) and (2) that the Census counts were valid
(recall that they are at least 25% off), and we interpolate linearly the missing
data (we have only three unreliable years, 1940, 1950, and 1960, for the 42
year period from 1928 to 1970), then we obtain data that we can use to add to
the institutionalization number.
For historical data on jail populations, I was able to obtain data for
decennial years (1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980) as well as 1933, 1972,
1978, 1982, and 1983 from Cahalan. 154 For data since 1983, I rely on the

148. CAHALAN, supra note 134, at 73, 76 tbl.4-1.
149. Id. at 76 tb4-1.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at73.
Id.
Id. at 76 tbl.4-1.
Id. at 76 tbl.4-1, 87 tbl.4-11.

1786

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 84:1751

Sourcebook of CriminalJustice Statistics, and yearly Prison and Jail Inmates
and Prisonerspublications of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 155 For missing
years, I have linearly interpolated the data.
When I run a model, it reduces the effect, but not by that much. The
results are summarized here:
Table 3: Adding jail rate to institutionalization in
studying the incarceration-crime nexus:
Prais-Winsten autocorrelation adjustment at lag 1 (ARI) regression results
Dependent variable = Homicide rates, 1928-2000
Explanatory
variables:
Institutionalization
plus jail rate:
Prais coefficient
Standard error
P value
Unemployment:
Prais coefficient
Standard error
P value
Proportion 15 - 24:
Prais coefficient
Standard error
P value
Poverty:
Prais coefficient
Standard error
P value
Durbin-Watson
statistic pre-PraisWinsten
Durbin-Watson
statistic post-PraisWinsten
OLS R-squared
N
=

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-.806(.235)
0.001

-.815"**
(.231)
0.001

-.774**
(.301)
0.012

-.78"
(.296)
0.009

-.833"**
(.274)
0.004

-1.15
(.378)
0.004

.047*
(.025)
0.061
-.0295
(.172)
0.864

.047*
(.025)
0.064

.159
(.106)
0.129

.015
(.169)
0.931

-.444*
(.251)
0.086
-.02
(.102)
0.845

-.258**
(.114)
0.030

0.081

0.098

0.081

0.129

0.203

0.379

1.274

1.396

1.269

1.393

1.017

1.183

0.351

0.437

0.352

0.484

0.565

0.821

73
73
statistically significant at 10% cutoff. **

=

73
5% cutoff.

73
42
-= 1% cutoff.

42

155. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE STATISTICS-2003, at 478 tbl.6.1 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2004),

available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/section6.pdf.

